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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL, 
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON, : REPLY BRIEF 
personally and on behalf of a OF APPELLANTS 
class of persons similarly : 
situated, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
: Case No. 20000864-CA 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
governmental entity, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, Hon. David Young, Judge Presiding 
(Trial Court Case No. 97-090-7950 CV) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "Plaint if f-Of f icers,/) 
submit the following reply brief in further support of their 
appeal from the judgment below: 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The County's gratuitous recitation of its Issues Presented 
for Review in this appeal is not helpful. Salt Lake County has 
not filed an appeal. Plaintiff-Officers' opening brief sets 
forth the issues presented for review and now before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF PACT REPLY1 
The County states that it adopted policies regarding pay 
practices. Brief of Appellee Salt Lake County (hereinafter 
"County Appellee Brief"), 7. None of those policies control or 
relate to the issue at hand. No policy forces Plaintiff-Officers 
to work without pay. Neither the Sheriff's Office Policy and 
Procedures nor the Salt Lake Personnel Policies direct that the 
Plaintiff-Officers should not be paid for briefings. 
Rather, the decision not to pay for the briefings was an 
erroneous interpretation by the jail commanders. Aff. of 
Biesele, 11/21/1996, f 12 (R. 730). Plaintiff-Officers were 
ordered by supervisors not to record the briefing time on their 
time cards. Interr. Answers Hudson, 8-9, f 11 (R. 688-689); 2nd 
Depo. of Cunningham, 18:14 to 19:6 (R. 723). Those Plaintiff-
Officers who did record the briefing time on their time cards 
were ordered by their supervisors to remove that time from the 
time cards.2 Interr. Answers Hudson, 8-9, 1 11 (R. 688-689); 2nd 
Depo. of Cunningham, 19:17 to 20:23 (R. 723). 
1
 Many of the County's "facts" are in reality argument. 
Accordingly, much of Plaintiff-Officers' reply to these "facts" 
is contained within the Argument section herein. 
2
 When the County became aware of that erroneous inter-
pretation and the non-payment, the County partially corrected the 
error and paid most jail staff and plaintiff class members for 
the briefing time worked retroactively to February 1, 1994. 
County Appellee Brief, at 9; see also Appendix E to the County's 
Brief, No. 1 page 4. 
2 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WAGE CLAIM IS A CONTRACTUAL CLAIM. 
A. Plaintiff-Officers Do Not Assert That County Policies 
Form A Contract. 
The County mis-states Plaintiff-Officers' position herein. 
County Appellee Brief, 10. Plaintiff-Officers do not assert that 
county policies form a contract. Rather, Plaintiff-Officers have 
written contracts which modify merit status and county policies. 
In particular, Plaintiff-Officers have written contracts which 
set forth that each would work for Salt Lake County and the 
County would pay for their services. These documents set forth 
the nature of the employment, starting date of employment, rate 
of pay, job code and other information establishing the nature of 
employment.3 
B. There Are No Public Policy Concerns In The Instant 
Case. 
The County relies upon public policy concerns regarding the 
terms of civil service employment; the County states, generally, 
that "[i]t is well settled that the terms and conditions of 
public service in office or employment rest in legislative policy 
rather than contractual obligations, and hence may be changed." 
3
 The County insists that the Plaintiff-Officers' 
"employment rights are strictly a creation of statute and County 
policy.'' County Appellee Brief, 13. However, there are specific 
terms of the employment agreements that are found neither in 
statute nor policy. These terms are set forth only in the 
Plaintiff-Officers' employment contract. 
3 
County Appellee Brief, 11 (citing Horn v. Utah Department of 
Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 101 (Ut. App. 1998) (a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Attachment "A")). However, the facts 
herein do not implicate a change in the terms of employment. 
Plaintiff-Officers have at no time requested a change in the 
terms of employment. Nor has the County sought a change. 
Rather, Plaintiff-Officers seek to enforce terms that have 
remained constant: compensation for service rendered. That 
public policy rationale is irrelevant in the instant case. 
C. Utah Law Holds that Contractual Rights Co-Exist With 
Statutory Rights. 
The County asserts that courts have "struggled" to apply 
contract commitments to civil servants. This statement is 
incorrect. Rather, the courts have categorized different rights 
and applied different analysis depending on the right being 
enforced. For example, Plaintiff-Officers are subject to 
statutory limitations when the county cannot (or does not) fund 
merit pay increases for a particular year. Weese v. Davis County 
Comm'n, 834 P.2d 3 (Utah 1992). Plaintiff-Officers are subject 
to statutory limitations should the county re-evaluate a 
particular job or perform a county-wide reassessment of all jobs. 
See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992); and, 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). Term-
ination of government employment is subject to statutory 
regulation, and administrative procedure. Horn. County 
4 
commissions cannot enter into contracts guaranteeing future wage 
increases for employees. Weese; Utah Const, art. XIV, § 3. A 
county cannot enter into a contract guaranteeing future or 
continued employment. Utah Const, art. XIV, § 3. Every contract 
entered with Salt Lake County must be in writing. Salt Lake 
County Ordinance § 2.04.100. Finally, any contract entered 
beyond the authority granted to a County is null and void. 
Weese. 
The foregoing cases, however, have never held that county 
employees do not have contractual employment or contractual 
employment rights.4 These cases acknowledge that counties can 
contract with employees. The court must look to the right that 
is being enforced to see whether a statutory or contractual 
analysis applies. Plaintiff-Officers' wage claim is a 
contractual claim and subject to a contractual analysis. 
As noted, Horn held that as to certain aspects of government 
employment (i.e., termination of employment), there are statutes, 
rules and regulations that govern. The facts of the instant case 
are easily distinguishable. There are no statutes, policies, or 
4
 Indeed, the County explicitly acknowledges Utah cases 
which hold that contractual rights co-exist with statutory 
rights. See County Appellee Brief, 12 n.5 ("public employees 
have a contractual right to accrued benefits''; "personnel policy 
manuals or other agreements between state agencies and their 
employees can create contractual rights in addition to public 
employees' underlying statutory rights"). The general statement 
that the County keeps repeating ("Jailers are statutory 
employees.") is not accurate nor helpful. 
5 
administrative rules applicable to the situation at bar. 
Although administrative rules and a procedure were available for 
the appellant in Horn to challenged his termination, there are no 
similar applicable administrative rules or procedures for the 
jailers to force the county to pay for time worked (and for which 
the jail commanders erroneously declined to pay). Therefore, the 
analysis in Horn is of limited use herein. 
D. Plaintiff-Officers Have Written Employment Contracts. 
The County contends that the documents Plaintiff-Officers 
introduced to show a written contract are documents which 
evidence their statutory merit employment status. County 
Appellee Brief, 14. Such an argument assumes that the two 
categories of rights (contractual and statutory) are mutually 
exclusive. There are not. They coexist concurrently. The 
statutory and contractual rights of state or county employees are 
concomitant. 
The County asserts that Plaintiff-Officers ''failed to meet 
their burden of establishing a written contract 'adding to' or 
'altering' their statutory employment relationship with the 
County." County Appellee Brief at 18 (a reference to the Horn 
case). The County asserts that the Plaintiff-Officers "were 
unable to produce signed written employment agreements evidencing 
an intent to create employment by contract and the court 
correctly found that the employment documents did not alter or 
6 
add to the terms and conditions of their statutory public 
employment." County Appellee Brief, 15. 
These statements are inaccurate. Plaintiff-Officers 
produced documents to establish written contracts whereby each 
would work for Salt Lake County and the County would pay for 
their services. Those documents include Letter from Sheriff N.D. 
"Pete" Hayward to Brock E. Hudson of January 11, 1990 (R. 130), 
Letter from Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard to Roy David Neizer of June 
1, 1991 (R. 131), Notice of Personnel Action (R. 132 & 133), Salt 
Lake County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission Policies 
and Procedures (R. 134-140 (policy related to payment of wages)), 
and, written agreements to follow such rules (R. 141). These 
various documents combined constitute an employment contract 
based upon written instruments. These documents set forth the 
nature of the employment, starting date of employment, rate of 
pay, job code and other information establishing the nature of 
employment. Absent these written documents, the terms and 
conditions of Plaintiff-Officers' employment are not determined.5 
The County asserts that Plaintiff-Officers have presented no 
"integrated writing which establishes a contract . . . ." County 
Appellee Brief, 9. An "integrated writing" is defined as "The 
writing or writings adopted by the parties to an agreement as the 
5
 For example, Plaintiff-Officers' individual hourly rates 
and job levels are set not by statute, but rather by these 
"integrated" written agreements between employee and employer. 
7 
final and complete expression of the agreement." Black's Law 
Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990). Utah law describes an "integrated 
writing" as follows: 
where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing 
which in view of its completeness and specificity 
reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is 
taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is 
established by other evidence that the writing did not 
constitute a final expression. 
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(3) (1981)). 
Herein, each Plaintiff-Officer has written documents 
establishing a contract whereby each would work for Salt Lake 
County and the County would pay for their services. Those 
documents are identified above. Those various documents combined 
constitute an employment contract based upon written instruments. 
Those documents are the "integrated instruments" which form the 
contract governing Plaintiff-Officers' compensation and 
employment. 
E. Plaintiff-Officers' Written Contracts Comply With 
County Ordinances. 
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 2.04.100 declares that all 
county contracts must be in writing. Nevertheless, the County 
claims that this ordinance does not apply herein.6 The County 
asserts that the ordinance "is part of larger procurement 
process." County Appellee Brief, 15. A review of the ordinance, 
6
 The County cites no authority to support this claim. 
8 
its context and location within the county code reveals no such 
larger process. Even if that were true, such a "larger process" 
does not preclude application to employment contracts. Nothing 
in that ordinance indicates that it does not apply to employment. 
Indeed, every Plaintiff-Officer has a written employment contract 
signed by all three county commissioners, giving strong 
indication that the ordinance does apply to the situation herein. 
F. Other Jurisdictions Distinguished. 
Finally, the County cites, without adequate analysis, two 
(2) cases from other jurisdictions to support its contention that 
all public employees are statutory employees: Chotkowski v. 
State of Connecticut, 240 Conn. 246, 690 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1997), 
and National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe 
Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985). These two (2) cases are 
inapposite to the case at bar. 
Chotkowski involved a state employee who claimed "the state 
of Connecticut improperly reduced his salary while he was 
employed at the state Veteren's Hospital . . . ." 690 A.2d at 
370. In Connecticut, "state employees serve by appointment, and 
^their entitlement to pay and other benefits must be determined 
by reference to the statutes and regulations governing 
[compensation], rather than to ordinary contract principles.'" 
Id. at 380 (bracket in original - citations omitted). In the 
case at bar, there are no statutes, policies, procedures, etc., 
9 
that determine Plaintiff-Officers' compensation. The deter-
mination of Plaintiff-Officers' compensation is found in the 
contractual documents noted above. Furthermore, no overt action 
by the County forces Plaintiff-Officers to work uncompensated 
(unlike the explicit determination to reclassify and reduce 
salary in Chotkowki). The rules, policies and procedures of the 
County mandate that Plaintiff-Officers be paid for time worked. 
National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe 
Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985), was an attempt by several 
railroads to determine that the Rail Passenger Service Act of 
1970 constituted a contract and/or created contractual 
obligations with the United States. The Supreme Court ultimately 
determined that the Act did not create a binding obligation. 
Herein, Plaintiff-Officers do not argue that a certain 
legislative act or ordinance of Salt Lake County constitutes a 
contract. Rather, Plaintiff-Officers assert that they have 
contractual rights concomitant with their statutory rights. The 
terms and conditions of Plaintiff-Officers' compensation are set 
forth largely in the contractual documents noted above, not by 
any legislative or regulatory action. 
Therefore, this Court should determine Plaintiff-Officers' 
wage claim is based upon the written contracts of the parties, 
and that the lower court erred in ruling that appellants were not 
contractual employees. 
10 
II. THERE ARE NO STATUTES, POLICIES AND/OR PROCEDURES TO JUSTIFY 
NON-COMPENSATION OF TIME WORKED. 
The County states that neither the statute nor the policies 
mandated by statute create written employment with public 
employees. County Appellee Brief, 16. While this is a true 
statement, it ignores the fact that Plaintiff-Officers have 
concomitant contractual rights. Furthermore, it ignores the fact 
that the County's policies and procedures mandate payment for 
time worked. 
The County asserts that County rules required Plaintiff-
Officers to record their time worked in 15 minutes increments. 
County Appellee Brief, 17. Such a policy does not mean that the 
county could require employees to work fourteen (14) minutes 
extra every day without pay. There is no policy that requires 
Plaintiff-Officers to work uncompensated for any amount of time. 
The County's repeated citation to a rule about "overtime" 
(County Appellee Brief, 17-19) is not helpful. Sheriff's Office 
Policy and Procedure ("SOPP") 2-5-03.02(6), Appendix B to County 
Appellee Brief. The time at issue, the briefing time, is 
referred to in the rules as "excess time." SOPP 2-5-03.02(6). 
Plaintiff-Officers receive their normal hourly rate for "excess 
time", as opposed to a premium rate (1H normal hourly rate) for 
"overtime". SOPP 2-5-03.02(6). 
That the County treated "overtime" of less than 15 minutes 
as de minimis and not compensable (County Appellee Brief, 19), 
11 
does not alter the fact that plaintiff/jailers were required to 
work ten (10) minutes of "excess time" on a daily basis for which 
they should have been compensated under the county's own rules.7 
SOPP 2-5-03.02(6); see also Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff's 
Merit Service Commission ("DSMSC") Policy and Procedure # 5105, 
Attachment "E", Plaintiff-Officers' Opening Brief (R. 134-140). 
Salt Lake County asserts that "Since County policy required 
time to be recorded in 15 minute increments there are no time 
records to determine if and when employees reported to briefing 
session." County Appellee Brief, 5. Plaintiff-Officers were 
required to be at work ten minutes early before each and every 
shift. No further records are necessary other than the 
employment records of each class member. 
The County was able to calculate and pay the briefing time 
retroactively for two (2) years as per the Villalobos action. 
County Appellee Brief, 19. Using the same methods and comparable 
records, the County knows what extra time Plaintiff-Officers 
worked for which they should be paid. In addition, the payments 
made in the Villalobos case are an admission by the County of its 
non-payment for work actually performed by those Plaintiff-
Officers . 
7
 The County admits that it should have paid Plaintiff-
Officers for the briefing time. The County states, "After the 
Villalobos lawsuit was filed, the County realized that briefing 
sessions should be compensable . . . ." County Appellee Brief, 
19. 
12 
Finally, the County ignores the fact that plaintiff/jailers 
were told not to record or submit briefing time on their time 
sheets. Plaintiff-Officers Brief of Appellant, 11 1 19. The 
County is not being entirely forthright by stating that 
Plaintiff-Officers have been paid "for all hours recorded" 
(County Appellee Brief, 19), when the County knows that the 
Plaintiff-Officers were instructed not to record the briefing 
time that is the subject matter of this lawsuit. 
III. PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WAGE CLAIM IS WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The County claims Plaintiff-Officers are attempting to 
extend the FLSA statute of limitations to establish a six (6) 
year statute of limits. County Appellee Brief, 19. That is not 
accurate; Plaintiff-Officers make no such claim. Rather, 
Plaintiff-Officers directly assert a six (6) year statute of 
limits because their claims herein are based upon written 
employment contracts. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1953 as 
amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) applies to 
"a liability created by the statutes of this state." No statute 
of this state creates the liability of Salt Lake County to pay 
wages to the Plaintiff-Officers. The liability or obligation of 
the County to pay wages is based upon the written employment 
contracts between the County and the Plaintiff-Officers. 
13 
Therefore, the lower court's invocation of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) is not supported by any case law 
or authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The County's repeated general claim "the terms and 
conditions of public service in office or employment rest in 
legislative policy rather than contractual obligations" (County 
Appellee Brief, 20) is much too broad and is thus not supported 
by the case law within or without Utah. This Court should 
determine that the documents presented by Plaintiff-Officers 
establish written employment contracts; that Plaintiff-Officers 
were employees of Salt Lake County based upon written employment 
contracts thereby subjecting their wage claims to a six-year 
statute of limitations; and re^ mand the case below for an 
accounting of wages owed to named plaintiffs and plaintiff class, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of JUNE 2001. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
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Attachment "A": Horn v. Ut. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 
962 P.2d 95 (Ut. App. 1998). 
17 
Michael W. HOM, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, a governmental agency; Cher-
ie Ertel; Douglas Bodrero; A. Roland 
Squire; Arthur Hudachko; Bart Black-
stock; and John Does I through X, De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 970592-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 16, 1998. 
Former employee of Department of 
Public Safety brought action against Depart-
402(25). Under the plain language of the defi-
nitions contained in the Act. V-l is a responsi-
ble party if it is the owner of a UST facility or 
has experienced releases. Although V-l may 
not be the only responsible party, it is liable for 
the abatement if it is at least a responsible party 
under the Act Cf. DEQ v. Wind River Petrole-
um. 881 P.2d 369, 873 (Utah 1994) (holding 
Utah Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-301 to -325 (1991 and 
Supp.1993), imposes strict liability on owner or 
operator of facility as responsible party). 
% Utah 962 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ment and individuals, alleging breach of em-
ployment contract and disability discrimina-
tion. The District Court, Henriod, J., granted 
defendants' summary judgment motion, and 
former employee appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Billings, J., held that: (1) former em-
ployee failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies, and thus, Court of Appeals lacked 
jurisdiction over Personnel Management Act 
claim, and (2) discovery rule did not apply to 
toll four-year limitations period applicable to 
Rehabilitation Act claim. 
Affirmed. 
L Officers and Public Employees 
<£=>72.41(2) 
Court of Appeals could consider for first 
time on appeal whether former employee of 
Department of Public Safety failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies under Per-
sonnel Management Act, which would de-
prive Court of subject matter jurisdiction 
over action. U.C.A.1953, 67-19-1 et seq. 
2. Appeal and Error «=>782 
When a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction the court retains only the author-
ity to dismiss the action. 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>229 
Parties protesting agency actions must 
generally exhaust all available administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial relief. 
4. Officers and Public Employees 
<3>72.41(2) 
Wrongful termination claim brought by 
former employee of Department of Public 
Safety was action in vindication of rights 
created by Personnel Management Act, and 
thus, Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act 
required employee to pursue grievance 
through administrative appeal, where em-
ployee failed to argue that Department en-
tered in to any contract with him that altered 
or added to terms and conditions of public 
employment included in Personnel Manage-
ment Act and implementing regulations. 
U.C.A. 1953, 67-19a-401(4)(a). 
5. Officers and Public Employees 
«>72.41(2) 
Former employee of Department of 
Public Safety, who brought action seeking 
vindication of Personnel Management Act 
rights, failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies, and thus. Court of Appeals lacked 
jurisdiction over Act claim vhere employee 
allowed his Career Service Review Board 
appeal to be dismissed for failure to prose-
cute. U.C.A. 1953, 67-19a-401(4)(a). 
6. Civil Rights <s=>210 
Utah's four-year statute of limitations 
applicable to personal injury actions general-
ly applies to Rehabilitation Act claims. Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.CA. § 701 et seq. 
7. Appeal and Error <£=>842(i) 
Limitation of Actions <3= 199(1) 
Issue of whether the discovery rule ap-
plies to toil the statute of limitations is a 
question of law, and thus, the Court of Ap-
peals needs to show no deference to the trial 
court's ruling on appeal, but reviews the 
ruling for correctness. 
8. Limitation of Actions <s=>95(I) 
"Discovery rule" tolls the running of a 
statute of limitations in some instances when 
a plaintiff was not in a position to know of 
the existence of the cause of action before 
the end of the limitations period. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
9. Limitation of Actions 0»95(1), 104(1) 
"Discovery rule'' tolls a statute of limita-
tions in the following three exceptional situa-
tions: (1) when the discovery rule is mandat-
ed by statute; (2) when a plaintiff does not 
become aware of the cause of action because 
of the defendant's concealment or misleading 
conduct; amd (3) when the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the application 
of the general rule would be irrational or 
unjust, regardless of any showing that the 
defendant has prevented the discovery of the 
cause of action. 
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L, Zane Gill, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 10. Limitation of Actions <$=> 104(1) 
Discovery rule did not apply to toll four-
year limitations period applicable to former 
employee's Rehabilitation Act claim, based 
upon employer's alleged concealment of exis-
tence of claim, where evidence indicated em-
ployee's termination v.as based on his job 
performance, rather than on any perceived 
mental disability, and employee failed to al-
lege that coemployees took affirmative steps 
to conceal claim. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
11. Limitation of Actions <3=>104(1) 
Under the concealment prong of the dis-
covery rule for tolling the running of a stat-
ute of limitations, a plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case that defendants actively con-
cealed the existence of a cause of action and 
that, given defendants' actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim 
earlier. 
12. Limitation of Actions <3=>95( 15) 
Discovery rule did not apply to toll four-
year limitations penod applicable to former 
employee's Rehabilitation Act claim, based 
upon exceptional circumstances, where em-
ployee knew all facts supporting his claims 
within limitations period and these facts were 
sufficient to put employee on notice that his 
superiors believed he was unstable. Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.CA 
§ 701 et seq. 
13. Limitation of Actions <s=»95(l) 
To meet the exceptional circumstances 
prong of the discovery rule for tolling the 
running of a statute of limitations, a plaintiff 
must show that he did not know of and could 
not reasonably have known of the existence 
of the cause of action in time to file a claim 
within the limitations period; once the plain-
tiff has made this showing, the court must 
apply a balancing test to determine whether 
a case presents exceptional circumstances 
that render the application of a statute of 
limitations irrational or unjust 
14. Limitation of Actions <s=95(l) 
Simple ignorance of or obliviousness to 
the existence of a cause of action will not 
prevent the running of a statute of limita-
tions. 
Jan Graham and Debru J. Moore, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Michael Horn appeals the trial court order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Utah Department of Public Safety (the De-
partment) and individual defendants in 
Horn's suit for breach of employment con-
tract, breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and disability discrimi-
nation. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Because this is an appeal from a granc of 
summary judgment, we recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 
1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). Horn presents the 
following account of the events leading up to 
and surrounding his termination from the 
Department. 
Horn was hired in 1985 as a program-
mer/analyst Although Horn was employed 
by the Department and had access to sensi-
tive law enforcement information, he was a 
career civil servant and not a sworn police 
officer. His primary responsibilities were to 
provide technical assistance and to remain on 
call to deal with computer problems for the 
Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCD and 
the Driver License Division. From 1985 
through 1987, Horn performed satisfactorily 
and received positive evaluations on his job 
performance. However, Horn concedes that 
during this period his supervisor advised him 
in job evaluations that he should try to im-
prove his "political and people skills." 
In 1987, Horn was appointed the technical 
subcommittee chairperson for a "Request for 
Proposal Committee" (RPC) formed by the 
Department to select a vendor for a new 
computer system. Horn's RPC duties were 
in addition to his regular work. Horn lost 
sleep, frequently worked cwenty-hour days, 
98 Utah 962 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
and felt stress and pressure because of over-
work. As the RCP selection process pro-
gressed, Hom became convinced that his fel-
low committee members were acting illegally 
to favor certain vendors. Hom confronted 
the other RPC members about this perceived 
illegal conduct. As a result of these confron-
tations, several coworkers lodged complaints 
against Hom, and he was banned from th^ 
Driver License Division offices. 
During the RPC dispute, Hom also became 
involved in a dispute with his direct supervi-
sor about overtime hours. Hom filed a 
grievance on this issue and won an award of 
additional overtime. Hom used the overtime 
to take a leave of absence, and he was away 
from the Department from November 1988 
to May 1989. 
In July 1989, Hom was assigned to super-
vise the Driver License Division annual job 
run, a major annual event in which Depart-
ment personnel purged the Driver License 
Division computer files. Hom encountered 
problems during the job run, and these prob-
lems led to a second internal affairs investi-
gation. As a result of the job run incident, 
Horn's immediate supervisor issued a letter 
of intent to reprimand and met with Hom to 
explain the reasons for the reprimand. The 
supervisor was concerned with Horn's refusal 
to obey the supervisor's direct orders, and 
Horn's inability to provide a satisfactory ex-
planation for the job run failure. Horn's 
supervisor was also concerned because Hom 
had ignored explicit instructions during the 
job run. The supervisor informed Hom that 
he could discuss disagreements and alterna-
tives with supervisors, but in the future Hom 
would be expected to carry out supervisors' 
instructions even if he disagreed with them. 
Horn objected to this requirement Horn 
then made a statement about having the 
power to crash and disable the Department 
computer system. Hom asserts that he in-
tended this statement as a claim that he 
would not follow an order that would crash 
the system. However, Horn's supervisor in-
terpreted it as a threat that Hom would 
crash the system. 
After this meeting, Hom was placed on 
temporary leave. On his return, Hom met 
with the BCI chief to discuss the internal 
affairs investigation and Horn's own plans to 
file a grievance over the job run incident. 
Hom alleges that the Department head at-
tempted to dissuade him from prosecuting 
his grievance and "warned him to work 
things out with" his supervisor. At this 
meeting, Hom made another statement about 
his power to damage the computer system. 
While Horn remembers this comment as a 
response to a theoretical question, the BCI 
chief remembers it as "coming out of the 
blue" and sounding like a threat Shortly 
after making this comment, Hom broke down 
and began crying uncontrollably. The BCI 
chief later stated that he felt Hom was "on a 
downward spiral" and had become emotional-
ly unstable. However, Hom states the BCI 
chief never recommended that he seek coun-
seling. 
During the subsequent internal affairs in-
vestigation, Horn's superiors concluded that 
he was responsible for the job run failure, 
had acted insubordinately, and had perjured 
himself. Hom was dismissed from the De-
partment in March 1990. The Department 
gave the following reasons for the dismissal: 
1) Hom was perceived to be a security threat 
2) Horn had committed perjury, 3) Hom had 
committed malfeasances and misfeasance, 
and 4) Hom had been insubordinate. 
Hom appealed his termination administra-
tively under the Utah State Personnel Man-
agement Act (Personnel Management Act), 
but his administrative appeal was ultimately 
dismissed for lack of prosecution. In 1994, 
Hom filed suit against the Department 
claiming that his dismissal violated the Per-
sonnel Management Act and Department of 
Human Resources (DHR) regulations imple-
menting that Act. In 1995, Hom amended his 
complaint to add a disability discrimination 
claim under the Federal Vocational Rehabili-
tation and Other Rehabilitation Services Act 
of 1978 (the Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701 to 796 (Supp.1998). The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Department dismissing both claims. Hom 
now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
Hom presents two arguments on appeal. 
First he argues the trial court erred in 
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barring his wrongful termination claim under 
the three-year statute of limitations for viola-
tions of rights created by statute. He as-
serts that his suit was an action for breach of 
contract subject to the six-year statute of 
limitations for claims arising out of contracts 
ir /riting under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
23(2) (1996). Second, Horn argues the trial 
court erred in refusing to toil the statute of 
limitations on his disability discrimination 
claim under the discovery rule. "Because 
summary judgment presents only a question 
of law, we review the trial court's determina-
tions under a standard of correctness, ac-
cording no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions.n Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Im-
ages & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 
CtApp.1997). 
I. Did Horn Fail to Exhaust His Adminis-
trative Remedies? 
[1,2] As a threshold issue, we first ad-
dress the Department's argument that we 
lack jurisdiction over this case because Horn 
has failed to exhaust his administrative reme-
dies under the Personnel Management ACL 
Horn argues that we cannot consider this 
issue because the Department did not raise it 
before the trial court. We disagree. If Horn 
has failed to exhaust his administrative reme-
dies, then we lack subject matter jurisdiction, 
and we must dismiss the case "[rjegardless 
of who raises the issue." Maverik Country 
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 
944, 947 (Utah CLApp.1993); see also Hi-
Country Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Sew. 
Comm\ 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989) 
(holding court had no subject matter jurisdic-
tion where plaintiff failed to timely appeal an 
agency order); Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Utah Ct. 
App.1991) (addressing defense of failure to 
exhaust remedies though raised for first time 
at oral argument on appeal). "When a mat-
ter is outside the court's jurisdiction it re-
tains only the authority to dismiss the ac-
tion." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
[3] Under Utah law, parties protesting 
agency actions must generally exhaust all 
available administrative remedies before 
seeking judicial relief. 'The basic purpose 
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underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies 'is to allow an adminis-
trative agency to perform functions within its 
special competence—to make a factual rec-
ord, to apply its expertise, and to correct its 
own error so as to moot judicial controver-
sies/ " Maverik Country Stores, 860 P.2d at 
947 (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 
37, 92 S.CL 815, 818, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972)); 
accord State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Utah Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 236 (Utah 
CLApp.1995). 
[4, 5] In this case, the Grievance and Ap-
peal Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-
I9a-L01 to -408 (1996), provided a clearly 
available administrative remedy. The Griev-
ance and Appeal Procedures Act provides a 
formal review process for career service em-
ployee dismissals. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-401 (1996). Furthermore, the Act 
explicitly prohibits judicial review of a career 
service employee's grievance when the em-
ployee has failed to pursue the grievance in a 
timely manner: 
(4)(a) Unless the employee meets the re-
quirements for excusable neglect estab-
lished by rule, if the employee fails to 
process the grievance to the next step 
within the time limits established in this 
part, he has waived his right to process the 
grievance or to obtain judicial revietv of 
the grievance. 
Id. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (1996) (emphasis add-
ed). 
Horn failed to complete the administrative 
appeal process. Horn initially appealed his 
dismissal to the Career Services Review 
Board (the Board) under the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act. However, Horn failed 
to actively pursue his administrative appeal. 
Thus the Board dismissed Horn's appeal in 
1993 for failure to prosecute. 
Horn attempts to dodge his jurisdictional 
problem by casting his claim as a civil action 
for breach of contract, rather than an action 
to vindicate rights created by the Personnel 
Management Act Horn argues that the Per-
sonnel Management Act and its implement-
ing regulations created a contract of employ-
ment in writing that was sufficient to give 
rise to a civil suit for breach of contract 
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Horn relies on several Utah, casea to argue by 
analogy that the Personnel Management Act 
and implementing regulations create sepa-
rate contractual rights for state employees. 
These cases fall into two groups. The first 
group- includes cases holding that public em-
ployees have a contractual, right to accrued 
retirement benefits. See Ellis v~ State Re-
tirement B<L, 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah Ct 
App.1988), affd, 78a P.2d 540 (Utah 1989); 
Newcomb v. Ogden City Pub. Sch. Teachers' 
Retirement Comm'n, 121 Utah 503; 508-10, 
243 PJ2d 941, 944 (1952). The second group 
includes cases holding that personnel policy 
manuals or other agreements between state 
agencies and their employees can create con-
tractual rights in addition to the public em-
ployees' underlying statutory" rights. See 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P2d 165, 
169 (Utah 1992) (piurston D; PiaciteUi v. 
Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 
1065-67 (Utah 1981). Both groups of cases 
are clearly distinguishable from Horn's case. 
Horn relies first on Utah cases holding that 
public employees have a contractual right to 
vested retirement benefits that cannot be 
abrogated by new state legislation. Under 
Utah law, public pension and retirement sys-
tems give rise to vested'contractual rights. 
See; e.g., Ellis, 757 P.2d at 885-86; Driggs v. 
Utah Teacher's Retirement £d, 105 Utah 
417, 421-23, 142 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1943). 
Horn, argues that his right to continued em-
ployment under the Personnel Management 
Act is comparable to a state employee's right 
to vested retirement benefits. 
"Utah and other jurisdictions have consis-
tently treated vested-retirement and disabili-
ty* benefits* as an exception* to the general 
rule that civil servants'' employment rights_ 
are statutory rather than contractual See, 
&£, Miller v. California, 18 CaL3d 808, 135 
CaLRptr.,386, 557 P.2d 970, 973 (1977); Gili 
v: Oregon, State Univ.,. 49 OrApp. 379, 619 
?2a\ 938,. 939-40 (1980); Personnel Division 
v. SL Clair, 10 OrApp. 106, 498 P.2d 809, 811 
(1972). We acknowledged this distinction in 
Ellis* 757 P.2d,at 886,i where we stated that a 
public employee obtains vested rights to re-
tirement benefits "only when he has satisfied 
all conditions precedent to receiving his ben-
efit, i.e.rhe has attained retirement age, o 
has been-medically disabled" 
The crux of Ellis and other public retire-
ment benefits cases was whether benefit 
earned by retired employees under a previ-
ous legislative scheme could be diminished or 
abrogated by new legislation. Horn's case is 
not comparable to these cases because it is a 
straightforward dispute about whether the 
Department met the requirements of the 
Personnel Management Act when it dis-
missed Horn, for cause. Thus we conclude 
that our past treatment of vested retirement 
benefits has no bearing on our characteriza-
tion of Horn's claim of wrongful termination 
under the Personnel Management Act 
In addition to the retirement benefits 
cases, Horn cites several Utah cases where 
agency personnel manuals and similar docu-
ments were held to create contractual em-
ployment rights separate from the underly-
ing statutory rights of public employees. See 
Thurston /, 835 P.2d at 168; Thurston v 
Box Elder Ccmnty, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-39 
(Utah 1995) (Thurston II); PiaciteUi 636 
PJ2d at 1065-67. Horn claims these cases 
show that the Personnel Management Act 
and implementing regulations constitute a 
written employment contract between Horn 
and the Department We disagree. 
In PiaciteUi the"Utah Supreme Court ad-' 
dressed a claim by a counselor at a state 
college that his termination violated his due^  
process rights as set forth in the college's 
personnel manual See PiaciteUi 636 V2d 
at 1064. However, the employee in PiaciteUi 
was explicitly exempt from the Personnel 
Management Act, and the court found that^  
the college's personnel manual had created' a 
separate employment contract in place of the 
statutory scheme. See id at 1066. Under 
these facts, the court found that Piacitellfs 
employment relationship with the college was 
governed by the college's personnel manual 
and was therefore contractual rather than 
statutory. See id. Thus, PiaciteUi involved 
an exempt employee with a written contract 
separate from the Personnel Management 
Act, and it has no bearing on Horn's claim 
that the Personnel Management Act and im-
plementing regulations constitute an action-
able employment contract 
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In Thurston I and Thurston //, a county 
employee sued for wrongful termination, 
casting his suit as an action for breach of an 
employment contract created by the county 
personnel manual. See Thurston I, 835 P.2d 
at 167. The Utah Supreme Court remanded 
the case, holding that the action was properly 
a statutory claim under the Personnel Man-
agement Act See id at 170. On remand the 
county argued that it was exempt from the 
Personnel Management Act because it had 
fewer than 130 employees. However, the 
court below refused to overrule the supreme 
court under the law of the case doctrine. See 
Thurston II 892 P.2d at 1037. We conclude 
that Thurston I and Thurston II do not 
establish, as Horn claims, that public employ-
ees' wrongful termination actions should be 
treated as suits for breach of contract 
Other jurisdictions faced with similar 
claims have uniformly rejected the proposi-
tion that a public employment act and imple-
menting regulations, without more, create a 
contractual right to continued public employ-
ment See. e.g., Tkorin v. Bloomfield Hills 
Bd ofEduc, 203 Mich.App. 692, 513 N.W.2d 
230, 237 (Mich.CtApp.1990) (Corrigan, P.J., 
concurring) (stating recognition of contractu-
al claims "in the public sector would have 
significant adverse policy ramifications . . . 
[and] lead to the denial of the right of the 
people, through their elected representatives, 
to decide crucial political questions"); Smith 
v. City of Newark 128 NJ.Super. 417, 320 
AJ2d 212, 218 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 
136 NJ.Super. 107, 344 A.2d 782 (1975) (stat-
ing "it is well settled that 'the terms and 
conditions of public service in office or em-
ployment rest in legislative policy rather 
than contractual obligations, and hence may 
be changed',f (citation omitted)). 
Horn has not argued that the Department 
entered into any contract with him that al-
tered or added to the terms and conditions of 
public employment included in the Personnel 
Management Act and implementing regula-
tions. We conclude that Horn's wrongful 
termination claim is an action in vindication 
of rights created by the Personnel Manage-
ment Act Consequently, the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act required Horn to pur-
sue his grievance through an administrative 
appeal. By allowing his Career Service Re-
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view Board appeal to be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute* Horn "waived his right to . . . 
obtain judicial review" of his dismissal. Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (1996). Horn 
has therefore failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies, and we have no jurisdiction 
to adjudicate his statuary claim. 
II. Did the Court Err in Dismissing 
Horn's Federal Disability Discrimina-
tion Claim? 
[6,7] Horn also filed a disability discrimi-
nation claim against the Department based 
on the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 
to -796 (Supp.1998). The statute of limita-
tions for claims under the Rehabilitation Act 
is the four-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to personal injury actions generally. See 
Baker v. Boaid of Regents, 991 F.2d 628. 
631-32 (10th Cir.1993) (holding statute of 
limitations for Rehabilitation Act claims is 
state limit applicable to personal injury 
claims). Thus the trial court concluded this 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations 
and dismissed it. Horn concedes that the 
four year statute of limitations applies to this 
cause of action. However, he argues that the 
trial court erred in dismissing his claim be-
cause the running of the statute of limitations 
was tolled in his case by operation of the 
discovery rule. "Because the issue of wheth-
er the discovery rule applies to toll the stat-
ute of limitations is a question of law, we 
need show no deference to the trial court's 
ruling on appeal, but we review it for correct-
ness." Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 
(Utah 1990). 
[8, 9] The discovery rule tolls the running 
of a statute of limitations in some instances 
where a plaintiff was not in a position to 
know of the existence of the cause of action 
before the end of the limitation period. See 
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 961-
63 (Utah CtApp.1993), vacated in part, 902 
P.2d 629 (Utah 1995). Utah courts will apply 
the discovery rule in three exceptional situa-
tions: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule 
is mandated by statute; (2) in situations 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of 
the cause of action because of the defen-
dant's concealment or misleading conduct; 
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and (3) in situations where the case pres-
ents exceptional circumstances and the ap-
plication of the general rule would be irra-
tional or unjust, regardless of any showing 
that the defendant has prevented the dis-
covery of the cause of action. 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Ina, 920 
P.2d 575, 578 (Utah CtApp.), cert denied, 
929 P^d 350 (Utah 1996). 
Horn urges us to apply*the discovery rule 
in this case because 1) other Department 
employees concealed torn him the fact that 
his mental instability was one reason for his 
termination, and 2) exceptional circumstances 
exist in this" case that prevented him from 
discovering the existence of a cause of action 
under the Rehabilitation Act. 
A. Concealment 
[10,11] Under the concealment prong of 
the discovery rule, a plaintiff must establish 
a prima facie case that defendants actively 
concealed the existence of a cause of action 
and that, given defendants' actions, "a rea-
sonable plaintiff would not have discovered 
the claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914 
P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996). Horn alleges the 
following facts to establish a prima fade case 
of concealment First, his termination notice 
did not include mental disability in the list of 
reasons for his firing. Second, in interroga-
tories during the early stages of litigation, 
the defendants did not state that they 
thought Horn was mentally or emotionally 
disabled Third, in 'depositions later in the 
litigation, several employees, including Horn's 
direct supervisor, stated that they began to 
worry about his mental stability toward the 
end of his employment because he acted 
irrational, angry, ,and "kooky." -
These facts are insufficient to establish 
that defendants took affirmative steps to con-
ceal the existence" of a cause of action. First, 
the evidence indicates that Horn's termi-
nation was based on his inability to perform 
his job or interact acceptably with coworkers, 
not on any perceived mental disability. Sec-
ond, Horn has not alleged that any Depart-
ment employees- took affirmative steps to 
conceal a cause of action. At most, the facts 
as Horn recounts them suggest that some 
Department employees thought Horn should 
seek counseling but did not explicitly tell hi; 
so- These facts do not add up to an afleg: 
tion that Horn's coworkers "took affirmatrv 
steps" that would have prevented, a reasor 
able person from discovering this allege 
cause of action. See Berenda, 914 PJM at 51 
We find this case similar to Anderson, wher 
we stated that "the facts underlying the alle 
gation of fraudulent concealment are so tenu 
ous, vague, or insufficiently established tha 
they fail to raise a genuine issue of materia 
fact as to concealment" Anderson, 920 ?2( 
at 580 n. 4. Thus we conclude Horn has not 
established a prima faae case of conceal 
ment 
B. Exceptional Circumstances 
[12-14] Horn also argues that his case 
presents exceptional circumstances that justi-
fy application of the discovery rule. To meet 
the exceptional circumstances prong of the 
discovery rule, a plaintiff must make two 
showings. First, he must show that he "did 
not know of and could not reasonably have 
known of the existence of the cause of action 
in time to file a claim within the limitation 
period." Sevy, 857 P.2d at 962. Once a 
plaintiff has made this threshold showing, the 
court must then apply a balancing test to 
determine "whether a. case presents excep-
tional circumstances that render the applica-
tion of a statute of limitations irrationai or 
unjust" Id at 963. "Simple ignorance of or 
obliviousness to the existence of a cause of 
action will not prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations." Anderson, 920 P.2d 
at 578. "All that is required to trigger the 
statute of limitations is . . . sufficient infor-
mation to . . . put [plaintiffs] on notice to 
make ftirther inquiry if they harbor doubts 
or questions." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. 
Horn presents no evidence to support his 
claim that he did not know or could not 
reasonably have known of this cause of ac-
tion. On the contrary, Horn knew all the 
facts supporting his claims within the statu-
tory period. Horn knew that he was under 
severe stress. Horn was aware of his deteri-
orating relations with coworkers. Horn knew 
of the complaints filed against him and of 
other employees' statements that they feared 
he was dangerous. He also knew that he 
had been banned from the Driver License 
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Division, and that his superiors had consulted 
the FBI because they thought he posed a 
serious security risk. These facts were more 
than sufficient to put Horn on notice that his 
superiors believed he was unstable. Even 
assuming such instability would qualify as an 
actionable disability, we conclude that the 
events leading up to and surrounding Horn's 
dismissal should have put Horn on notice that 
the Department might have terminated him 
because of a perceived mental or emotional 
disorder. Thus we hold the discovery rule 
does not apply, and Horn's disability discrimi-
nation claim is barred by the statute of limi-
tations. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that Horn failed to exhaust 
his adininistrative remedies under the Utah 
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State Personnel Management Act Thus we 
dismiss Horn's wrongful termination claim 
for lack of jurisdiction. We also conclude 
that the discovery rule did not toll the run-
ning of the statute of limitations on Horn's 
disability a^crimination claim. Thus we hold 
that Horn's disability discrimination claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ.t concur. 
